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The refugee is a sandal forph$osophy in 
that the refugee recalls the radical insta- 
bility of meaning and the incabculability 
ofthe human. The refugee is a scandal for 
politics also, however, in that Uheadvent 
of the refugee is always a reprwch to the 
fomzation ofthe political ordet or subjec- 
tivity which necessarilygiv@ rise to the 
refugee. The scandal is intensi@pany 
politics of identity which piresupposes 
that thegoal of politics is the realization 
of sovereign identity. The prfncipal ar- 
gument, then, is that what Izpill call the 
scandal of the refugee i l lumbtes both 
the fundamental entologi~al deter- 
minations of international pblitics and 
the character of political action, because 
the refugee is both afunction the inten- 
tionnl political destruction $ the onto- 
logical horizons of peoplds always 
already heterogeneous wc)rlds, and 
effects an equally fundawental de- 
construction of the ontologic~l horizons 
which constitute theequally heterogene- 
ous worlds into which, as refqgees, these 
people are precipitated. It is precisely on 
this concreteand corgoreal sile that both 
the ontological horizons and the allied 
political decision-making ~f modern 
politics are thrown into stark reliefand 
profoundly called into questllon. For it is 
precisely here that the very actions of 
modern politics both create and address 
the incidence of its own massband self- 
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generated, political abjection. If that is 
one of the principal ends of international 
relations, one isforced to ask, what does 
it takeas its beginning? I f ,  in other words, 
the vernacular political architecture of 
modem international power commonly 
produces l:lE forcibly displaced peo- 
pleglobally, one is inclined to ask about 
the foundations upon which that archi- 
tecture is itselfbased. 
La rhlitkdu refugeest unescandalepour 
la philosophie en cela que le rdfu@nous 
rappelle l'instabilitkradicalede la signi- 
fication et l'incalculabilitk de l'humain. 
Mais lerdfugdest aussiun scandale pour 
la politique en cela que l'avi?tmnent du 
r@gik est toujours un  reproche h la for- 
mation de l'ordre politique ou de la sub- 
jectivitt qui suscite nkcessairement 
l'apparition du rdfu@. Le scandale est 
intensijZpar toute politiquede l'identitk 
qui prksuppose que le but du politiqueest 
la rhlisation del'identitksouveraine. Le 
principal argument, dam ce cas, est que 
ceque jenommerais le&ledu rdfugk! 
illumine h la fois les dkterminations on- 
tologiques fondamentales de la politique 
internationale et le caract2re de l'action 
politique, car le rkfugik est h la fois une 
fonction de l'intentionnelle destruction 
politique des horizons ontologiques des 
mondes toujours-dkjri hktkoghes des 
peuples, et ilentrafneune tout aussi fon- 
damentaledestruction des horizons onto- 
logiques qui constitue les mondes tout 
aussi hktkoghes duns lesquels, en tant 
que rttfgds, ces peuples sont prkcipitks. 
C'est exactement sur ce site concret et 
corporel que les horizons ontologiques 
et les prises de ddcision corollaires de la 
politique modme sont mis h nu etferme- 
ment remis en question. Car c'est exacte- 
ment ici que l'action eflective de la 
politique moderne crke et envisage les 
incidences de sa propre abjection politi- 
que, massive et autogMrie. Si cela est 
unedes principalesfinalitks des relations 
internationales, force est de demander 
que se donnent-elles comme point de dt- 
part? En d'autres termes, si l'architec- 
ture politique vernaculaire du pouvoir 
international moderne produit ordinai- 
rement l:l15personnesglobalementdk- 
plackes deforce, on est en droit de poser 
des question sur les fondements sur les- 
quels repose une tellearchitecture. 
"If yougaze longenough into an abyss, 
the abyss willgaze back into you."' 
Introduction: The "Inter" of 
International Relations and the 
Refugee 
Neither aco-nationalnor, even, another 
national, the refugee is, instead, distin- 
guished precisely because s\he i s  
located in the strange territory o f  es- 
trangement which is located between 
the two; denaturalized, as a recent study 
o f  migrationnotes, having "no  means o f  
identifi~ation."~ Neither in nor out- 
while nonetheless, o f  course, actually 
bearing the name o f  some previous iden- 
tification on, and existing in a carefully 
def ined no-where place within the 
boundaries o f  some other nation or 
state, so clearly also undeniably 
present-hebr brings the very "Inter" o f  
international relations t o  the fore- 
ground in a disturbing and unusual 
way, insisting that it become the concen- 
trated focus o f  attention which it de- 
serves tobe. 
In search o f  a home, because forcibly 
deprived, b y  violent and sustained po- 
litical intent, o f  their previous home, the 
refugee brings t o  presence the very 
question o f  the home as such, and o f  its 
relation to  politics. The refugee is a sup- 
pliant in search o f  a home, with pahi- 
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fully indelible memories of a home that 
once was. Often with an abiding, 
seducing, nostalgia for a home that 
never was. For the violent event of dis- 
placement, of dislocation and subse- 
quent diaspora, itself generates a 
necessary representation of home 
which inevitably calls into question 
what home was really like. No one 
knows what home was really like, how- 
ever, because the home recalled is not 
the home that was and yet also, thehome 
that was could not have been the se- 
curely domesticated home one thought 
it was, because it proved so susceptible 
to radical dispersal and dissolution. 
The question of the home is therefore 
radically problematized by the unset- 
tled, and is never resettled even when 
the unsettled regains a home.3 
How, then, in all the senses of this 
term, is one to address the refugee? And 
how does that problem of address illu- 
minate what the refugee illuminates 
about the human condition as such? 
For, while intentionally displaced, the 
refugee is not purposefully sent. 
Equally, while in desperate need of sus- 
tainable and survivable means of habi- 
tation, the refugee is not destined for 
some previously inscribed forwarding 
address. This experience-literally, of 
no known address-discloses some- 
thing that is itself fundamental to the 
human: its very own lack of address, its 
own unsettledness. Their names erased, 
or Babelised, the places from which they 
fled changed beyond original recogni- 
tion by the violence of expulsion itself, the 
refugee is one who-no longer safely 
responding to their previous name- 
cannot be hailed securely by that origi- 
nal ethnic, religious, social or political 
designation. An administrative cat- 
egory for that which is no longer reliably 
fixed, locatable or designatable-one 
waiting in a sometimes interminable 
line, camp or holding-tank, for some 
other assignment-the refugee is hu- 
man or s\he is nothing; or, at least, noth- 
ing but raw stuff. Here, then, is the 
inescapable and irresolvable, yet also 
practical and immediate-indeed, in 
our times massively posed-onto- 
political question, that the refugee 
brings to presence. What is tobehuman, 
when the human is precisely that which 
is in between-neither simply one 
thing, nor the other, precisely "inter" 
without a secure term or dwelling 
place? And how arenot onlypoliticsbut 
the thought of the political related to this 
question? The very advent of the being 
who is precisely without secure arid 
unambiguous home, identity or name, 
the refugee both raises our need while 
challenging our capacity to articulate or 
acknowledge the "we." That,Isuggest, 
is not only the territory of the political in 
an age which has to be out-lived if the 
human is to have a future, it is also, and 
quite precisely, the territory of the inter 
of an international relations that is ca- 
pable of out-thinking its own tradi- 
tional designation; as a techne, skilled in 
calculating the inter-subjective political 
arithmetic of Modernity's given politi- 
cal subjectivities. For it is precisely that 
arithmetic obsession-the techne of 
modern political subjectification and 
governance itself-which now pro- 
duces its own massive political 
abjection in the form of the refugee. 
The Refugee as Constitutive 
Outsider 
Exadlybecause s\ he destroys the old 
trinity of state-nation-territory, the 
refugee, an apparently marginal fig- 
ure, deserves on the contrary to be 
considered the central figure of our 
own political history.' 
What historical politicality-quality or 
project of being political, circumscrib- 
ing the very domain of political intelligi- 
bility-is raised here by the advent of 
the refugee? What are we to make of 
what is going on when the political dis- 
course of state-nation-territory does not 
merely enact that which it names-ma- 
terializing the state, the nation and the 
territory-but the very "outside" upon 
which it draws for the articulation of its 
most traditional legitirnatory functions; 
representation of the people, and the 
monopoly not only of the legitimate use 
of force for the purposes of security but, 
also, the prior monopolistic determina- 
tion of the definition of h a t ?  What 
conclusions are we to draw from the 
following observations? That the 
harder a politics conditioned to secure 
production of the coherent 
identity "-*I? t which its discourses refer, 
the more it seems to produce, "the un- 
speakable, the unviable, the non- 
narrativiaable . . . the tra~matic,"~upon 
whichit relies. Yet, also, the more itpro- 
duces thak which it cannot abide, the 
more the impossibility of its project is 
confirmed; such that, what remains 
outside the political subject, set there by 
the very acts which found the subject, 
persists a$ an integrally defining nega- 
t i v i ~ . ~  In what ways might this seem- 
ingly paradoxical political condition 
have becoine not only the condition but 
also thevefy occasion of some further, of 
some othdr, political thought and ac- 
tion? 
This essay on the theme of the refugee 
is not, thafore, an essay in the largely 
policy analytic tradition of refugee stud- 
ies. Neither is it simply an essay in iden- 
tity politids, whereby the fear of the 
other, ene*y or stranger is exploited in 
the contestkition over the constitution of 
certain W d s  of political subjectivity. 
The scandd to which it refers is a quite 
different register of scandal, also, from 
that in whilch we are usually invited to 
share when we are gathered by political 
and media representations of it to wit- 
ness the gpectacle of the refugee's 
abjection. Moving beyond that register 
of scandal) the essay offers a different 
one, and sbks as well to indicate the 
measure of its political implications, 
This register of scandal is plural. It re- 
fers to the scandal of the human as such. 
It addressels also the scandal of the in- 
hospitabilib of the techne of modem 
politics: pdlitics understood as techne, 
politics technologized by techne; poli- 
tics whose $nd has become the applica- 
tion and operation of techne. Finally, and 
relatedly, ik provokes the scandalous 
thought that the political project to 
which m e r n  politics itself now gives 
rise is preciWly not that of its self-reali- 
zation: not that of the instantiation of 
sovereignv; not that of the securing of a 
home, not dhat of the resolution of al- 
ienation;n&that, even, of the represen- 
tation of thepeople. It is the challenge to 
out-live the global politics of Modernity 
itself. Out-like, that is, in all of the senses 
of that phrase: survive; exceed; tran- 
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scend; live more fully than the totality 
which the modem in modem politics 
both promises and threatens: though it 
is, ordinarily, bound to renege on the 
promise and fail fully to realize it as a 
threat. 
Different identity politics, of course, 
determine different things to be alien to 
them. How the alien appears, and the 
experience of the alien as alien, also 
waxes and wanes, however, according 
to different times and according to dif- 
ferent philosophical systems. How the 
alien is alien similarly determines how 
the self-same-in both philosophy and 
politics-is itself not simply consti- 
tuted, but continuously re-inaugurated 
in the process of trying to make the alien 
proper. There, theref~re~brewsnot only 
beneath all identity politics, but also 
beneath all allied philosophical sys- 
tems, a secret horror alieni that 
insidiously seeks to dispel all aliens- 
alienness itself-to divest things of eve- 
rything enigmatic and strange. If they 
cannot do that, they seek, instead, to 
drive-out the stranger, making that es- 
trangement the bearer of all that such 
systems find fearsome and tlweatening, 
evil, sinful and barbarous. 
The constitution of any scxial group 
or political community is amatter of the 
exercise of inclusions and exclusions. 
The semantic field of the alien is, there- 
fore, manifold and its political register 
is determinative of political commu- 
nity. All this is, by now, well-appreci- 
ated. 
Mass expulsion and forceful dis- 
placement of peoples are not, of course 
therefore, a modern phenomenon. 
Equally, exile and diaspora are not ex- 
clusively modemexperiences. But, if all 
philosophical systems, and all social 
and political grouping, are constituted 
on the basis of complex practices of in- 
clusion and exclusion, then the nature 
of modem inclusions and exclusions 
are peculiar to and, therefore, do dis- 
close something fundamental about, the 
particular character of political Moder- 
nity, Albeit the point being explored 
here is not at all dependent upon the 
question of quantity, the sheer scale of 
the mass forced displacement of peo- 
ples globally in our times, for example, 
does seem to be distinctive, and it has 
given rise to analytical crises in those 
areas of study-migration and refugee 
studies, for example-as well as politi- 
cal crisis in those areas of national and 
international policy-making concerned 
with immigration, emigration, refugee 
protection, humanitarian intervention, 
asylum-seeking and regulation? That 
crisis serves here, however, as a pretext 
which, in addition, possesses a power- 
ful rhetorical appeal for broaching a 
discussion which would apply even if 
there was only one displaced, one non- 
assignable, human being in the world. 
The violent character of modem glo- 
bal estrangement also seems to be ex- 
traordinarily diverse. Consider, for 
example, the cast of out-casts which 
distinguishes modem forced displace- 
ment of peoples: refugee; political refu- 
gee; development refugee; internal 
refugee; asylum seeker; oustee; depor- 
tee; relocee; involuntary displaced per- 
son; involuntarily resettled person; 
forced migrant; involuntary migrant, 
and so on. Consider, too, the portfolio of 
policies that have given rise to them: 
war; internal security actions; low- 
intensity operations; pacification; 
ethnocide; genocide; pogroms; political 
repression; racial and religious dis- 
crimination; conquest;colonization; ter- 
ritorial appropriation; state-building; 
nation-building; self-determination; 
famine: urbanization; industrializa- 
tion; and development. In 1993, out of a 
world population of about 5 billion the 
UNHCR estimated that around 1 in 
every 130 people had been forced into 
flight across state  border^.^ Given the 
complexity and confusion surrounding 
the production and movements of refu- 
gees, together with the shifting legal 
politics of classification which charac- 
terizes the categorization of people as 
refugees, the precision of these figures is 
questionable and said significantly to 
underestimate the scale of the phenom- 
enon. Later reports, "including people 
forced into flight within their own state 
territories, thus classlfymg refugees as 
part of an extraordinarily large and vari- 
egated global phenomenon of coerced 
displacement, therefore record that 
something in the region of 1 in 115 peo- 
ple find themselves in this condition? 
While, "there are as many reasons for 
moving as there are migrants,"1° glo- 
bally-and it is now increasingly diffi- 
cult for migration analysts and 
legislators alike to distinguish effec- 
tively between voluntary migration, in- 
voluntary migration, forced migration 
and expulsion-the production of the 
modem refugee is distinctive, and does 
differ from earlier, particularly nine- 
teenth century refugees, in the way in 
which it is defined in terms of the whole- 
sale devastation of the very ontological 
horizons of their worlds and their re- 
duction to worldless beings unwelcome 
amongst the worldliness of others. At- 
tributed to a complex combination of 
war; violent mass political repression; 
geo-political instability; regional and 
global economic transformation, in the 
form of the re-division and re-distribu- 
tion of capital, labour and industry; 
man-made environmental disaster; and 
civil conflict, the overwhelmingly sin- 
gle most important reasonnow is, how- 
ever, violent internecine conflict. The 
vast majority of refugees are precipi- 
tated by generic violence against civil- 
ian populations. "Virtually all of the 
refugee producing conflicts taking 
place in the world during the early part 
of 1993," according to the UNHCR 
study, "were within states rather than 
between them."ll Development studies 
have, however, documented how devel- 
opment itself also generates at least 
equal numbers of refugees as well. In 
short, the modern refugee is an 
(inter)national political production of 
its age and cannot but disclose the 
fundaments of it. 
It is not my intention, however, to re- 
fine either the taxonomies of these mod- 
ern out-castsnor that of the policies that 
have given rise to them. Taxonomies are 
generally concerned with advancing 
knowledgeable control of the objects of 
study by refining their categorization. I 
want, instead, to probe into what the 
refugee as such discloses about modem 
politics. I amconcerned, on the contrary, 
therefore, with precisely that which- 
like the refugeewhile categorizable 
nonetheless exceeds categorization. For 
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the refugee, like the human itself, is al- 
ways both more and less than human, 
Thus, while the manifold ways in which 
expulsion and revulsion are experi- 
enced can be taxonomized, and taxo- 
nomic precision has its advantages in 
other forms of argument, expulsion and 
revulsion-the effect of being strange or 
estranged-always brings to presence 
the uncanniness of strangeness as such. 
That is to say, the uncanniness of Being 
within a category categorized as being 
without a category-that of the refu- 
gee--discloses the very uncanniness of 
the human itself, its improbable condi- 
tion of always already containing both 
more and less than it seems it ought 
naturally to contain. 
Because the constitution of any so- 
cial group or political community is a 
matter of the exercise of inclusions and 
exclusions consequently does not mean 
to say that one set of inclusions and 
exclusions is the same as any other. Nor 
is it to say that because there have al- 
ways been people who have been out- 
casts we can legitimately concentrate 
upon the native and the home, and thus 
forget about the stranger and the out- 
side. On the contrary the "we" is inte- 
grally related to, because formed by, this 
relationship with the alien. Given the 
horrors inflicted upon the alien, it is 
understandable, indeed almost ortho- 
dox, to deny difference and urgently 
champion an all encompassing inclu- 
sion so as to mitigate or eradicate the 
terrors of exclusion. 
Here, too, however, arises a further 
reverberation of the scandal of the refu- 
gee in the form of another scandalous 
thought. To be more fully "we" might 
precisely not entailbeing a more inclu- 
sive"we." The politicality of such a way 
of being would necessarily also com- 
prise, therefore, other, precisely 
deconstructive, political entailments, 
practices,dispositions and sensibilities 
extending, and differing quite sigrufi- 
cantly from, those of any politics or 
project of inclusivity. It might, instead, 
entail different ways of thinking about, 
and different ways of seeking to 
entertain, that very relationship of 
alienness-what Nancy calls the "we" 
of being-with-which literally articu- 
lates us the human-expresses and 
joins, joins by expressing, links through 
the medium of Language itself. 
All order, in short, encounters the 
alien or the strange which is defined not 
in relation to itself at all. Such alienness 
is beyond the trial of propriety to which 
strangeness is continuously submitted, 
including especially those codified in 
immigration and asylum-seeking pro- 
cedures: a wonderfully "naive" in- 
stance of which follows: 
Are you or have you at any time been an 
anarchist, or a member of or afiliated 
with a Communist or other totalitar- 
ian party? 
Have you advocated or taught, by per- 
sonal utterance, by written or printed 
matter, or through affiliation with an 
organization (a) opposition to organ- 
ized government; (b) the overthrow of 
government by force; (c) the assaulting 
or killing of government officials be- 
cause of their official character; (d) the 
unlawful destruction of property; (e) 
sabotage; (f) the doctrines of world 
communism, or the establishment of a 
totalitarian dictatorship in the United 
States? 
Have you engaged in or do you intend to 
engage in prejudicial activities or un- 
lawful activities of a subversive na- 
ture? 
Are you ajflicted with psychopathic per- 
sonality, sexual deviation, mental de- 
fect, narcotic drug addiction, chronic 
alcoholism, or any dangerous conta- 
gious disease? 
Are you a pauper, professional beggar or 
vagrant? 
Are you a polygamist or do you advocate 
polygamy? 
Have you committed or have you been con- 
victed of a crime of moral turpitude?12 
These are among the questions you 
would have to answer should you be 
seeking to join, and be accepted as a 
proper member of, the United States. 
Other trials of propriety, however, are 
more Kafkaesque than farcical. 
The alienness to which I am referring 
now concerns an alienness which is not 
the property of any person, people, 
place or thing. It does not belong to en- 
tities, albeit that it comes to presence in 
the appearance of persons or things. 
Propriety oesnotattach toit all. Hence 
it is not a 1 roperty of the world but an 
indelible, if fugitive, aspect of the world 
within whose horizon it is continu- 
ously and variously encountered. The 
semantic field, and thus also the politi- 
cal register of the alien-here through 
the figure ofthe refugee-in always dis- 
closing this alienness, consequently 
also simultaneously always betrays the 
philosophical register of the horroralieni 
as well. Buried in the political register of 
that horror alieni is therefore also some- 
thing more fundamental about the 
fundaments of being that philosophy, 
and thus political Modernity, is in- 
clined to express. 
For the refugee alerts us to, by bring- 
ing to presence our awareness of, a dif- 
ferent ontological condition definitive 
in many ways of the ontological turn; 
that of the ontological difference be- 
tweenbeings and Being as such. Recog- 
nition of the ontological difference is 
recognition of the mutually disclosive 
belonging together of Being and be- 
ings-of the excess that always already 
inhabits the being of human being, 
whose absent presence doesnot come to 
presence as such-which gives rise to 
the deconstruction which is always al- 
ready at work in the coming to presence 
of human being and of Language; the 
mode in which it comes to presence. 
Thus deconstruction is less a technique 
than the irresistible consequence of the 
ontological difference whose play 
makes of humanbeing a free and incom- 
plete plethos, 
Alert to this ontological dimension of 
identity politics, we can be alerted also 
to that other register of scandal to which 
I referred in my opening. It is that 
strangeness, then, the strangeness 
which comes to presence with the ad- 
vent of the stranger or the alien, takes 
this essay not only through but also 
beyond identity politics-where the al- 
ien or the stranger is regarded as viru- 
lent because the idea of order is 
premised upon the operation or realiza- 
tion of a unity, even of an ensemble of 
many beingeto scandalizes its philo- 
sophical underpinnings: traditional 
understandings of the idea-the eidos- 
of unity as such. For the advent of any 
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stranger is the limit at which the integral 
and indelible strangeness of the human 
condition as such makes its appear- 
ance. 
Accepting that other times and other 
forms of life have treated strangers 
badly, or manufactured strangers of 
themselves, does not, then, deny that 
modem estrangement happens in its 
own modem way and for its ownmod- 
em reasons. We can therefore note that 
our age is one in which political order is 
not simply premised upon the realiza- 
tion of a unitary but on a certain kind of 
technological, utile uniformity of, iden- 
tity; in pursuit of which the very activi- 
ties of their own states, together with the 
global capitalism of states and the envi- 
ronmental degradation of many popu- 
lous regions of the planet, have made 
many millions radically endangered 
strangers in their own homes, as well as 
criminalized or anathematized stran- 
gers in the places to which they have 
been forced to flee. Although we have 
some sense of why it was, it is, nonethe- 
less, still utterly astonishing that- 
while millions upon millions of people 
were engaged in massive Trans-oceanic 
Euro-American and intra European 
migration, itself accompanied by the 
forcible transfer of at least equal num- 
bers of people through the globally com- 
mercialized slave trade and, later, the 
so-called "coolie migration"--it was 
insisted that politics be understood as 
grounded upon a secure triangulation 
of territory, nation and state; when the 
facts so massively spoke of the mobility 
of people, the mutability of boundaries, 
the "mongrel-arlry" of nations and the 
specular artificiality of the state. 
The scale of the politically 
instrumental-deliberate, legal and 
policy-initiated-manufacture of es- 
trangement in world politics necessar- 
ily calls into question, therefore, the very 
moral and political foundations and 
accomplishments of the modem age; 
particularly those of the state and of the 
international system of states. 
In such circumstances-and given 
the vaunted political and moral claims 
made imbehalf of states and of the inter- 
national state system, as well as of 
so-called international society-we 
seem increasingly left not knowing to 
what symbolic space, to what under- 
standing of the human way of being, we 
can entrust what we variously call free- 
dom and humanity.13 Modem politics, 
the politics of Modemity, continuously 
undermines, however, its own most vio- 
lent, most intense, most totalizing at- 
tempts to securely free humanity. And 
this is not because of some technical 
deficiency on its part the global politics 
of Modernity is the expression of poli- 
tics as techne. It is because it is not real- 
izable. In the process the modern 
expression of identity politics, while 
thus disclosing something also about 
themodern world's response to strange- 
ness as such, provides a powerful inti- 
mation that the reception which the 
modem we accords the strangeness of 
the human way of being is what the very 
dis-order of political modernity itself 
calls into question. 
Specifically, modern political 
subjectificationcreates its own peculiar 
form of political abjection. Originally 
applied to French Huguenots who fled 
to England after the revocation of the 
Edict of Nantes in 1685-and therefore 
a direct function of early modern 
absolutist understandings of the 
entailments of stable, legitimate and 
authoritative political order, and their 
consequences-the refugee is precisely 
the figure which identifies the political 
abjection of the modem age. 
Abject means cast-out, abjection 
means also the act of expelling. It marks 
the failure of the political subject to be a 
pure political subject even in the act of 
trying to realize that ideal. Marking the 
porosity of the limits of that which seeks 
to be the self-same, it is the waste which 
continuously disturbs identity, system 
and orderbecause as the outside repro- 
duced by the inside it continuously ir- 
rupts in a way which erodes the very 
parametersby which the inside seeks to 
be defined. That which the effort to 
subjechfy creates, its production marks 
the impossibility-the abject failure- 
of what modern political subjec- 
tification idealizes and aims to realize. 
For the political practices of burning, 
chasing, raping, expelling, degrading, 
murdering, humiliating, terrorizing, 
excoriating, removing, burying, hiding, 
suppressing and devastating, invent 
and re-invent the very waste they name 
and exorcise in the process of continu- 
ously re-inaugurating, as politics, a cer- 
tain imperative of political unity and 
malleable uniformity. Waste, as Ricoeur 
noted, is not waste without its wasting 
processes; its protocols of purgative 
production.14 Neither is it undifferenti- 
ated since its processes of production 
are themselves plural. Abjection-the 
systems own self-produced and self- 
producing perturbation-is neither in- 
side nor outside but the in-between, 
boundary or limit which enacts the dif- 
ferentiation. Abjection is (inter)national 
politics, and as (inter)national politics 
it insists on a preoccupation with the 
inter anterior to the national. 
Since the seventeenth century, of 
course, while the intemational defini- 
tion of the refugee specifies the crossing 
of state borders, the incidence of "refu- 
geeism"-to coin an awful neologism 
for an awful condition-has been ex- 
tended in many intensive ways to the 
massive forced re-location of peoples 
within their existing territorial bounda- 
ries and for the purposes of "develop- 
ment" and, "resettlement" rather than 
of traditionally religious or political 
persecution. Social Scientific research 
on involuntary resettlement mush- 
roomed between 1984 and 1994 in re- 
sponse to the discovery that WorldBank 
funded development projects-notably 
those concerned with the building of 
large-scale dams-manufactured mas- 
sive impoverishment instead.15 Com- 
plexly complicit in the violent 
appropriative and exploitative politics 
of the political andeconomic elites of the 
recipient states, politically mandated 
mass re-locations of people did not 
merely enrich some and pauperize 
most, in ways systematically related to 
the mutations of global capitalism, but 
effectively and radically de-worlded 
those who were resettled. That in turn 
provoked reformations of identitybome 
out of resistance to the experience itself. 
Here, then, is a further mutation of the 
processes and protocols of the produc- 
tion of abjection which discloses some- 
thing else about the governmental 
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imperatives of politics in late modem 
times. In consequence: 
Development-caused displacements, 
that seemed to be piecemeal occur- 
rences and were estimated as totaling 
far less than the number of refugees 
worldwide, have turned out to be a 
much larger process than all the world's 
new refugee flows. Refugees and de- 
velopment displacees, of course, are 
not "numbers" that compete with 
each other, but are global parallel 
dramas sometimes intert~ined.'~ 
The principal difficulty with the 
overwhelming volume of this research 
is, however, the propensity to de-politi- 
cize the issue by translating it into pre- 
cisely that technical policy-analytic 
enframingwhich contributed to thepro- 
duction of the problem in the first place. 
Technology thus translates the question 
of the political into certain kinds of 
problematizations; requiring rigorous 
calculability, utility, and govern- 
mentality. It then feeds itself on the his- 
tory and further elaboration of the very 
problematizations it introduces. l7 
Albeit, then, the theme of abjection 
also arises here, the essay is not a treat- 
ment of the refugee as victim. Refugees 
have always offered, and been, more 
than mere objects of pity and suffering, 
something which the Huguenots 
themselves, of course, also demon- 
strated.18 As abjection, the refugee 
consequently also calls into question 
the foundational underpinnings both 
of the community from which s \he has 
been expelled and the community into 
which they seek to be received. What is 
at issue, in short, is the very question of 
human dwelling and belonging in a 
world. That in tum raises the point, 
well-made by Judith Butler in another 
discussion, of how "such socially satu- 
rated domains of exclusion" be recast 
from their status as constitutive outsid- 
ers, "to beings that matter."19 I take the 
refugee to be a being that matters in re- 
spect of the world (dis)order of political 
modernity, the requirement to out-live 
it, and the possibility of the possibility of 
doing so. The essay is thus, instead, a 
contribution to what the political theo- 
rist William Connolly has called 
ontopolitical interpretation. 
By the ontopolitical Connolly refers 
tothe way in which every political inter- 
pretation invokes a set of fundaments 
about the necessities and possibilities 
of human being; about, for instance, 
"the forms into which human beings 
may be composed and the possible 
relations which humans may establish 
withnat~re."~~Foxthe on, or the onta, of 
ontology refers to the reality of really 
existing things. In making his point 
about the way in which all political in- 
terpretation is simultaneously also 
ontopolitical because it cannot but dis- 
close the ontology sequestered within 
it-to repeat: making any statement 
about what is, is always already to find 
oneself within an understanding of the 
is as such--Comolly demurs at the 
logos of ontology because he finds the 
idea of the logic of reality apart from 
appearance too determinative and re- 
strictive. It suggests a principle or de- 
sign of being, when it can and has, of 
course, been argued that the fundamen- 
tal thing about being is that it exhibits no 
such overriding logic or principle. 
Surveying the various means by 
which modem political thought has 
elided the ontopolitical-modem secu- 
larism, pragmatism and epistemologi- 
cal realism, for example--Connolly 
concludes that this elisionalso obscures 
a convergence of ontological views. 
Asking rhetorically, "What if some 
common presumptions of our times . . . 
containdangerous demands and expec- 
tations within them? What . . . if the 
points of ontopolitical convergence in 
the late-modemnation-state turn out to 
be exactly the domain in need of reas- 
sessment today?"21Com~llynotes that 
this is precisely what that strain of think- 
ing from Nietzsche onwards contends 
"that every detailed interpretation pre- 
supposes answers to fundamental 
questions of being, and that this is in- 
deed one of the territories of modem 
discourse that requires critical reflec- 
t i ~ n . " ~ ~  
My contention is that the advent of 
the refugee brings that very territory of 
modem discourse directly into ques- 
tion, because the refugee is a function of 
the dangerous ontopolitical conver- 
gences which Connolly notes. Specifi- 
cally, that ontological narcissism, to 
which he r b fers in his essay on "Free- 
dom and Contingency," in which free- 
dom has become associated with the 
security of being in command, the corol- 
lary of which appears to mean being 
subjected to intensifying control.23 
Amongst other things, therefore, out-liv- 
ing the modem is critically associated 
also, therefore, with out-living these 
dangers. The advent of the refug-e 
whose very own ontological horizons 
have been devastated; one removed 
from a world-thereby dramatically 
exposes and radically disrupts the 
ontopolitical horizons not only of the 
hosts in which they arise, but also of 
political Modernity as such. Finally, the 
essay seeks to draw-out a sigruficantly 
different set of ontopolitical supposi- 
tions which the advent of the refugee 
also helps to disclose. 
If this provides some early, if all too 
brief, an indication of what I mean by 
out-living the modem, I cannot give 
some comparable and positive indica- 
tion of what Imean by the scandal of the 
refugee, however, without also elabo- 
rating the very different ontopolitical 
fundaments which the advent of the 
refugee brings to presence. Just as 
Comolly draws on a certain range of 
philosophical resources to make his 
point about the elisions and dangers of 
the onto-politics of late Modernity, I 
draw upon the same resources to offer 
this alternative ontopolitical account of 
the human; in which its estrangement 
from itself is the very scandal that the 
refugee brings so forcefully and politi- 
cally to presence in the (dis)ordering of 
world politics. It is that estrangement, 
as itself an ontopolitical point of depar- 
ture, which is both the condition and the 
occasion of another politics. 
The Ontopotitical Condition of 
Worldly Estrangement 
What becomes of being-with when 
the with no longer appears as compo- 
sition, but rather as dis-position?24 
In excess of the humanitarian scandal 
of the refugee, and in excess of the policy 
analytic and policy-making crisis in- 
duced by the astonishing growth of refu- 
gees in the past ten years. Inexcess, also, 
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of the politicalcrisis which the advent of 
largenumbers of refugees excites in the 
countries to which they flee, or of coun- 
tries like the United Kingdom in which 
the narcissistic politics of identity 
seems designed to go phobic at the least 
provocation of alienness, the scandal of 
the refugee is not only the scandalous 
thought that politicalModernity has to 
find a way of out-living rather than of 
realizing itself. In excess of, but also in 
alliance with these other registers of 
scandal, the advent of the refugee al- 
ways brings to presence this: the scan- 
dal of the human as such. That scandal 
is the scandal of human freedom which 
makes both politics and law possible 
without making either politics or law 
certain. It is a scandal from which the 
telic understandings of politics, as a 
form of making that results in a 
technologizing of politics seeks to save 
us; and in the process subjects us to 
novel, possibly terminal, globalized ter- 
rors and dangers. 
Human being is a mobile way of be- 
ing on its way frombirth to death which 
lives life without owning whatever 
gives life. It is, then, in the condition of 
an originary dis-possession because it 
enjoysno security of tenure over the fi.ee- 
hold of its existence. That leaves it in the 
curious position of having to own itself 
without possessing original title to it- 
self. It simply does not, and cannot, 
possess a secure property right in itself, 
of itself. In consequence, it makes-up 
wonderfully implausible stories to ac- 
count for this predicament and binds 
itself to, and with, them in the hope that 
they may make such a peculiar way of 
being somewhat easier tobear. Techno- 
logical mastery of ourselves and "na- 
ture" through submission to the 
spectacular power and productivity of 
representative calculative thought, pro- 
jected on and through, rather than 
grounded in, the idea of a sovereign 
reasoning subject, is the specular 
mythological achievement which dis- 
tinguishes and determines our own 
politically modem times. 
Philosophers (some philosophers) 
call this difference-the difference be- 
tweenbeings that exist and existence as 
such-the ontological difference. In- 
sinuated into the very being of human 
being it is what makes human being 
plural more than one. That plurality is 
not, it should be noted, the plurality of 
many human subjects, however those 
subjects are specified: people; nation; 
class; race; religion; or even citizen (by 
virtue of subscription to the constitu- 
tion of a republic and its civic culture). 
An evenmore disturbing phenomenon, 
that plurality is what might be called an 
onto-plurality. Installed within the be- 
ing of every humanbeing, the plurality 
of such a difference is not an Hegelian 
relational concept of difference either, 
in which differenc~ome would call it 
Otherness-is only difference in rela- 
tion tome and, therefore, not truly differ- 
ent or Other at all.25 Rather, it is an 
irreducible and irremissible Otherness 
or difference which, constitutive of hu- 
man being, is nonetheless beyond its 
mastery. What identifies human be- 
ing-its freedom, in raising and an- 
swering the question of its own 
existence, also to recognize this 
Otherness or difference which is inte- 
grally constitutive of it-is simultane- 
ously what disrupts its identity with 
itself as well. 
Enjoying an existence which is plu- 
ral as such-itself a plethos rather than 
merely comprised of a plurality of be- 
ings-the human inhabits a strange- 
ness which alsoinhabits it. Abeing that 
is itself radically transitive, occurring 
through time and so originally histori- 
cal rather than merely mobile, the 
worldly estrangement of human being 
is an interrogatory way of being that, in 
having only itself henneneutically to 
answer to, is, nonetheless, in the posi- 
tion of having to answer to a m ~ s t e r y . ~ ~  
To be worldly here is to have a certain 
modality of alienation "inscribed at the 
heart one's existence, and to give this 
alienation an extremely positive valida- 
tion."" On its way from birth to death, 
and consequently therefore always al- 
ready on the move into a future in which 
it becomes that which it has never yet 
been, human being thereby necessarily 
also remains fundamentally a stranger 
to itself. The scandal of the refugee is 
that the human is itself not simply natu- 
ral, not-to play on the scan of scan- 
dal-reliably metrical. Calculative, it 
nonetheless simply does not add-up. 
The scandal, in short, is that the human 
is itself alien-, in that while of neces- 
sity it dwells in a world, it is not, and 
cannot,be fully at home there: because it 
never received vacant possession, does 
not own the freehold and has no secu- 
rity of tenure in it. Thehope which, there- 
fore, arises with the refugee exceeds the 
hope that the alien might find a "home," 
and entertains the possibility that the 
onto-alienness of human being might 
ultimately also find ways of being hos- 
pitable to itself. Finding such ways and 
articulating such a hope are, I believe, 
also ways of newly-understanding the 
project of democratic politics, provoked 
by the advent of the refugee and drama- 
tized by the dangers of world (dis)order 
in late-modern times. 
Such a condition-freedom to give 
the law that is a freedom before the law 
of that which is, in Nancy's paradoxical 
phrase, "legitimately without law (de 
droit sans droitY"'-is not just a scandal 
to reason, it is also ethically scandalous 
as well; which is to say, "a snare, trap, 
or cause of moral stumbling . . . a stum- 
bling-block" [OED]. Continuously hav- 
ing to find its feet, the human way of 
being is thus simultaneously, also, the 
occasion of its downfall as well. Noth- 
ing bears it up in its disposure other 
than its composure. That composure, 
however contrived, evenunder modem 
forms of representative democratic gov- 
ernment which ground their legitimacy 
in the representation of "the people," is 
a fallible act made possible in virtue of 
that ontological freedom. Such compo- 
sure isnot, however, the telos or end of a 
politics of making, of politics under- 
stood to be a process of fabrication. 
Rather, it is the endless work of assum- 
ing the burden of being free, in laying 
down the law, to be interpreting the law 
in consequence of the exception to the 
law which the law itself necessarily 
brings to presence. To have an end is 
oidy possible in the condition of not 
having any end as such. Political-I 
would add, democratic-composure is 
the deferral of the end that would end all 
purposefulness. It is a tricky act to pull- 
off because, continuously disrupted by, 
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human being has nonetheless continu- 
ously also tocome to terms with& origi- 
nal disposure; its thrownness into a 
world in which it knows not from 
whence it came, nor where it is headed. 
To note and consider the ontol- 
ogizing effect of the refugee, however, 
does not mean abandoning the eco- 
nomic, political or personal dimension 
to the refugee, any more than it means 
abandoning the terrain of judgment. 
The ontologizing effect does not remove 
us to some abstract or speculative region 
at all. It is a question of entering these 
other so-called empirical, but in 
Arend tian and Heideggerean language 
simply worldly, regions differently. For 
the word means the thought of existence 
and the status of it today means think- 
ing our, especially political, existence 
on the level of the challenge which the 
refugee brings to our capacity less to 
secure a home and more to create and 
live in habitable worlds. Hence, we are 
ontopolitically indebted to the refugee. 
That debt cannot be repaid, but it canbe 
explored and acknowledged through a 
political thought other than that which 
has helped to make the refugee one of the 
principalbearers of the cost of the politi- 
cal (dis)order of the modern world, 
where the technological understanding 
of politics as fabrication-state-build- 
ing; nation-building, nation-state- 
building, hegemonizing; counter- 
hegemonizing-is paramount. To bring 
the derelicted into thought in this way is 
neither to patronize, nor to avoid, the 
devastation of their dereliction. It is an 
exercise neither of good nor of bad con- 
science. It is to respond positively, in- 
stead, to the refugee's profound 
provocation of political thought; by 
which I mean their provocation both to 
think politically and, in thus thinking 
politically, to think against the onto- 
political convergences which distin- 
guish modem political thought. 
For the refugee raises the question of 
association beyond, outside, in the mar- 
gins, or in excess of, established politi- 
cal sociation; because the refugee is by 
definition a-social, a-political. Being 
political, one might say the being of 
politics, is profoundly at issue here, 
then, in and through the presence of the 
refugee. The figuration of the abjection 
at the heart of modem political subjec- 
tion, of the associational poverty at the 
centre of so much political sociation, 
and of the impoverishment of being- 
within today's global togetherness, the 
refugee exposes how belonging together 
politically has become belonging to- 
gether at the production of the spectacle 
of politics, including that of the 
abjection integral to it. The advent of the 
refugee nonetheless still ruptures the 
horizons-spoils the show--of socie- 
ties which desire tobe left only to them- 
selves, seeking to affirm their social and 
political being by reference to no hori- 
zonbut themselves. What emerges from 
taking the refugee even more seriously, 
therefore, than, say, refugee studies 
might perhaps unfairlybe said to do, is 
not the idea of some sovereign indi- 
vidual or communal, rights-based, un- 
derstanding of humanbeing, however, 
which requires extension to the being 
which has beenexpelled from its world. 
The problem with rights here in this 
argument concerning the politically 
dislocating ontologizing effects of the 
advent of the refugee-that is to say, 
aside from any tactical questions con- 
cerning the provision of some means of 
protection to the outcast-is that it ap- 
peals to one of two grounds, each of 
which is equally unsustainable in the 
face of the alienness that the refugee 
brings to presence. On the one hand, 
rights are the fruit of the enforceable law 
of a community. On the other, rights are 
said to be the natural endowment of 
what it is to be human. The refugee is, of 
course, refugee invirtue of its expulsion 
from, and very oftenby, the enforceable 
law of a community, There is no enforce- 
able communal law-UN conventions 
on refugees are just that; conventions 
which the existinglegal communities of 
states interpret for themselves, and may 
or may not apply to themselves-to 
which the refugee has recoursez9 That 
is the point to being a refugee. Con- 
versely, the appeal to what is said to be 
the natural endowment of the human 
raises the ontological question of the 
natural. Here the advent of the refugee is 
radically disruptive because the event 
of the refugee's alienness calls to mind 
the of the human as such: the 
very non- aturalness of the onto-plu- 
rality; throwness and responsibility of 
its abyssal freedom. For if the human 
were simply natural it would not have 
this freedom-with all its attendant 
burdens of decision-to be. 
The question of taking the refugee 
even more seriously is not, however, 
simply a question, either, of some 
sociality or alterity that problematizes 
the authority of the subject understood 
as a solus ipse: "It is more than this and 
~omethingelseentirely."~~It is amatter 
of the ipse itself, of its very belonging 
together in and through its inherent plu- 
rality. That with which we are associ- 
ated, and that which associates us, in 
short our capacity to say "we" the hu- 
man, is what is at issue; mundanely, 
corporeally; and increasingly, in our 
world,massively. The advent of therefu- 
gee, therefore, poses both the ontologi- 
cal question politically and the political 
question ontologically. Hence the dra- 
matic, and dramatically disruptive, 
ontopolitical valence of the refugee. 
Neither a neighbournor a friend, linked 
by neither a politically fraternal, com- 
munalnornational bond, the advent of 
the refugee poses the question of the 
"we" of the human as such and dis- 
closes its co-ipseity beyond, or other 
than, our current understandings of the 
belonging together of the human way of 
being. That co-ipseity is obscure, 
enigmatic and opaque. Readily deni- 
able, it is nonetheless also impossible 
to escape. Inescapably ethical, its 
inescapability has also gone global, and 
sets-up aporetic perturbations in all 
settled systems of political order and 
understanding, including those of 
Communitarian and Liberal thought.31 
Michael Walzer, for example, admits as 
much. 
At the extreme, he notes in Spheres of 
Justice, "the claim of asylum is virtually 
undeniable. I assume that there are in 
fact limits ta our collective liability, but 
I don't know how to specify them." But 
if that is true, he went on, "why stop 
with asylum? Why be concerned with 
men and women on our territory who 
ask to remain and not with men and 
women oppessed in their own coun- 
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tries who ask to come in? Why mark-off 
the lucky or aggressive, whohave some- 
how managed to make their own way 
across our borders, from all others? 
Once again I don't have an adequate 
answer to these  question^?"^^ 
Raising the question, the capacity, 
and our necessity tobe able to say "we," 
the refugee does so in circumstances 
which are authorized, thereforelneither 
by God, the Leader, the Nation, the State, 
nor the People. Rather, the refugee raises 
that need in the circumstances in which 
none of these ontopolitical figures says 
it for us. The refugee does so, and 
crucially, in precisely those circum- 
stances when these figurations of the 
ontopolitical convergences of modem 
times-those very ontopolitical 
signifiers which operate as rallying 
points for mobilization and polit- 
icization fated nonetheless to dishon- 
our their promise, "both to urufy the 
ideological field and to constitute the 
constituencies they claim to repre- 
~ent,"~~-tell us, instead, exclusively to 
say "1." Notbeing able to say "we" in the 
circumstances in which it is most called 
for-that is to say, when we are not au- 
thorized to do so, and when it is the 
strange and different that we are enter- 
taining, is precisely, however, what al- 
lows each "I" the dementia which 
results ultimately in individuals not 
being able to say "I" any more either. 
That is what makes the refugee a touch- 
stone of thevery democratic politicality 
of any community-its capacity, in 
making way for other beings, to make 
way for other ways of politicalbeing to 
be in its very own way of being.34 
The"we" is in question as a question, 
then, when faced with the refugee be- 
cause the refugee poses the very 
questionability of the "we" at us directly 
and politically, but in a way in which 
the answers we have currently settled 
upon--and in-no longer answer. That 
"we" obliges us to find other ways of 
saying "we" again, and through that 
inescapable insistence binds us in a 
peculiarly ethical form of 
"commonality." Once more our onto- 
political indebtedness to the refugee 
surfaces, for the refugee attests to the 
very apvticness of the "we" and re- 
opens it for us. In the process-precisely 
because the "we," however enigmati- 
cally, &we, however we are, are con- 
tinuously re-configured. Herein, then, 
lies the intimation of the possibility of a 
different ontology of the species of po- 
litical being: of one always already 
strange to itself, one more equipped to 
address the plurality always already 
insinuated into being. Here the "with 
of associationis what the political takes 
as its question not as its ground, pre- 
cisely because it is human being's very 
own questionability. And it assumes as 
the commission of that very omission, 
precise lack of any secure answer to 
what the human is, the commitment to 
keep the with of that indefinable "we" 
open. 
I want to conclude, then, in a kind of 
amplified and intensified Arendtian 
way. It is this plethos which allows for 
the very possibility of politics; because 
it constitutes an ontological freedom 
which, in distinguishing human being 
as the way of being which is obliged to 
raise and respond to the question of its 
existence, without ever being in a posi- 
tion to answer it, devolves upon it the 
responsibility to lay down the law, and 
thus order its own affairs. It is not sim- 
ply, then, the question of the "inter," but 
of its very irresolvable questionability, 
that gives rise to politics at all. 
I would call that politics democratic 
which didnot merely claim to represent 
"the people," did not begin with a sub- 
ject individual or collective, but was 
committed instead to continuously fore- 
stalling the foreclosure of freedom en- 
tailed in having to give an answer to the 
question of the self and of the commu- 
nity. I would also call that politics 
democratic if it was one which was thus 
committed to the projed of keeping open 
the question of who "the people" (the 
deinos) is, that is, of continuously dis- 
closing, rather than foreclosing, the "in- 
ter" or "we" in the human way of being. 
Democracy to come would thus b e d -  
ways already is-the forestalling of the 
foreclosing of this questionability; even 
in its own fore~losing.~~ Is it not this 
which constantly takes place in the "In- 
ter" of international relations; despite 
what international relations once 
thought itself to endorse, as knowledge 
and as politics, and so to be as a disci- 
pline? 
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